Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation by Morrison, Edward R.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2007 
Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation 
Edward R. Morrison 
Columbia Law School, emorri@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Law and 
Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation, 50 J. L. & ECON. 
381 (2007). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2265 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
381
[Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 50 (May 2007)]
 2007 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/2007/5002-0014$10.00
Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical
Study of Continuation Bias in Small-
Business Bankruptcies
Edward R. Morrison Columbia University
Abstract
Many small businesses attempt to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, but most are ultimately liquidated instead. Little is known
about this shutdown decision. It is widely suspected that the bankruptcy process
exhibits a continuation bias, allowing failing businesses to linger under the
protection of the court, which resists liquidation even when it is optimal. This
paper examines the shutdown decision in a sample of Chapter 11 bankruptcy
cases filed in a typical bankruptcy court over the course of a year. The presence
of continuation bias is tested along several dimensions—the extent of managerial
control over the bankruptcy process, the accuracy and speed with which viable
and nonviable businesses are distinguished, and the characteristics of the hazard
of shutdown compared with the predictions of a formal model. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, the paper finds that continuation bias is either absent or
empirically unimportant.
1. Introduction
Many critics argue that Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is an inefficient
mechanism for reorganizing financially distressed corporations. Chapter 11 is
federal law. It gives managers of distressed corporations a nonwaivable right to
file a bankruptcy petition and thereby halt all creditor collection efforts for
months (or years) as the managers draft and then negotiate a plan of reorgan-
I am grateful to the members of my thesis committee, Douglas Baird, Gary Becker, and Steve
Kaplan, for support and detailed comments. I also thank Jennifer Arlen, Kenneth Ayotte, Ian Ayres,
Theodore Eisenberg, Jeffrey Gordon, Marcel Kahan, Avery Katz, Thomas Miles, Mark Ramseyer,
Robert Rasmussen, Mark Roe, David Skeel, George Triantis, Elizabeth Warren, Eugene Wedoff, two
anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Vanderbilt University, Georgetown University, Yale
University, Columbia University, Northwestern University, University of Pennsylvania, New York
University, Cornell University, Harvard University, and University of Virginia for helpful comments.
I am particularly indebted to the judges of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Illinois for permitting access to the court’s electronic records. Felton Booker, Jeong Song,
Christopher Swart, and Robert Tennenbaum provided excellent research assistance. Financial support
from the John M. Olin Foundation and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged.
This content downloaded from 128.059.178.073 on September 27, 2018 12:05:34 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
382 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
ization. The process of drafting and negotiating a plan is costly. Bris, Welch, and
Zhu (2006) find that it generates direct administrative costs ranging from 2 to
10 percent of firm value. The process also generates significant indirect costs, as
Hotchkiss (1995), Opler and Titman (1994), and others have emphasized. Busi-
nesses that should be liquidated are allowed to linger indefinitely under the
protection of the court. Chapter 11 prevents or retards the reallocation of the
assets even when a failing business’s assets may have greater value in the hands
of another owner. Rent-seeking competition among secured and unsecured cred-
itors dominates a process overseen by judges who lack business training and are
biased in favor of preserving businesses that should be liquidated (see, for ex-
ample, Bris, Welch, and Schwartz 2005; Bebchuk and Chang 1992; Baird 1986).
These ex post inefficiencies are as evident in large-business cases (Weiss and
Wruck 1998) as they are in small-business cases (Aghion, Hart, and Moore 1994,
p. 871; LoPucki 1983), and as Schwartz (1997) argues, these inefficiencies increase
the cost of capital ex ante.
That is the traditional view of Chapter 11. In this paper, I present evidence
that challenges the traditional view as it applies to small-business Chapter 11
cases.1 Using a sample of all corporate Chapter 11 filings in the Chicago area
during 1998,2 I find that the direct and indirect costs of small-business Chapter
11 cases are small. Nearly 60 percent of these businesses were shut down. The
court either dismissed the Chapter 11 case, permitting liquidation under state
law, or converted it to a Chapter 7 proceeding under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
which mandates automatic liquidation. Among businesses that were shut down,
the decision to dismiss or convert the case came quickly. For 50 percent of these
businesses, the shutdown decision was made within 3 months of filing. For 70
percent, it was made within 5 months. For the businesses that failed, then, the
Chapter 11 process was remarkably short. As a general matter, it took no more
time than did rival procedures.3
Moreover, the Chapter 11 process appears to sort effectively between businesses
that are viable and those that are not. Biases commonly ascribed to the system
are largely absent from the data. Neither creditors nor debtors (managers or
equity holders) dominate the bankruptcy process. Instead, bankruptcy judges
play a major role in filtering failing businesses from viable ones, and they appear
to be able to do this job well. The businesses that are liquidated quickly exhibit
1 Small businesses make up the vast majority of the filings. Other recent empirical work, although
not focusing on small-business Chapter 11 cases, reinforces the view that the costs of reorganization
are not as large as usually thought (see, for example, Maksimovic and Phillips 1998; Andrade and
Kaplan 1998; Gilson 1997).
2 The filings were lodged in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, whose jurisdiction encompasses Chicago and outlying areas.
3 A mandatory auction regime would likely take between 2 and 9 months (see the sources cited
in footnote 20). Thorburn (2000) finds that Swedish auctions take between 1.5 months (for the
median business) and 2.4 months (for the mean business). Other commonly proposed alternatives
to Chapter 11—see, for example, Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992)—contemplate a process that takes
several months to run.
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markers of economic distress, such as an inability to pay ongoing expenses even
after obtaining bankruptcy protection. In contrast, reorganized businesses exhibit
markers of financial distress, such as overexpansion.
Finally, patterns characterizing the duration to shutdown—especially the non-
monotonicity of the hazard rate and the inverse correlation between the hazard
rate and the volatility of earnings—are consistent with an economic model of
optimal decision making developed by Morrison (2003) and Baird and Morrison
(1999, 2001). Taken together, these findings suggest that the small-business Chap-
ter 11 process has significantly lower cost and displays significantly less bias than
is commonly thought.
Because the paper’s findings are based on data from small-business bank-
ruptcies, I cannot, of course, generalize to cases involving large corporations,
such as Conseco, Kmart, and United Airlines.4 The data are, however, well suited
to studying the costs of and potential bias in the Chapter 11 process generally.
Small businesses have relatively simple operations and capital structures, and
the probability of shutdown in bankruptcy exceeds 50 percent (shutdown is a
relatively rare event in large corporate bankruptcies). In addition, according to
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (1997), small businesses make up
at least 85 percent of all Chapter 11 filings.5 The findings presented here shed
light on the bankruptcy process in the vast majority of cases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and presents
summary statistics. Section 3 shows that the data are inconsistent with conven-
tional accounts of continuation bias. Section 4 examines the same data again,
using a formal model of the shutdown decision, and again finds little evidence
of bias. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data Sources
The data are drawn primarily from case files of the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division (hereafter, Northern District), and from records of the Secretary
of State of Illinois. The Northern District was chosen because of the size of its
jurisdiction, its similarity to other courts, and the availability of data. The
Northern District’s jurisdiction encompasses Chicago, Cook County, and out-
lying counties within the Chicago-Naperville-Joliet metropolitan division—the
third largest in the United States (see U.S. Census Bureau 2003). Like most
bankruptcy courts, the Northern District receives Chapter 11 filings from pre-
dominantly small businesses. During the 1990s, filings by large publicly traded
corporations were generally filed in the District of Delaware and Southern District
4 These cases, like those studied in this paper, were filed in the Northern District of Illinois.
5 A “small business” is defined as one with $5 million or less in debt. See National Bankruptcy
Review Commission (1997, p. 631).
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of New York (see, for example, Ayotte and Skeel 2006; Rasmussen and Thomas
2000).6
I accessed the Northern District’s case files using an online database, Public
Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER),7 which contains images of every
filing and judicial order in cases filed after January 1, 1998. I supplemented this
database with another, ILREC, an Illinois public records database available on
Lexis-Nexis. It identifies the founders, founding dates, and (where applicable)
termination dates of most businesses in PACER.
This study focuses on outcomes in cases filed during 1998, the first year of
available data. For each case, I used PACER to obtain information about the
business’s finances (assets, debt, cash flow, and the like), history (including events
that led to the bankruptcy petition), and experience in bankruptcy (time in
bankruptcy, types of motions filed by the debtor and its creditors, types of court
orders, and so on). The ILREC database was used to obtain information about
the dates of business founding and termination.
2.1. Sample Selection
According to Northern District records,8 184 Chapter 11 petitions were filed
during 1998 by corporations and individual debtors. Not all filings are relevant
to the analysis here. This paper is concerned with the effect of Chapter 11 on
the reallocation of assets, especially the decision to reorganize or liquidate a
distressed business. Chapter 11 filings by corporations outside the real estate
sector present the simplest context in which to study this decision. Individuals
may file Chapter 11 petitions, but their filings involve two separate issues—a
fresh start for the individual and, sometimes, the continuation of a business.
Only a fraction of all individual filings involve businesses. Some are submitted
by individuals who want to avoid liquidation of nonexempt assets under Chapter
7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The code offers individual debtors an opportunity
to keep these assets by filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, but this type of
bankruptcy proceeding is available only to debtors with sufficiently small debts
(see 11 U.S.C. sec. 109(e)). Thus, an individual may file a Chapter 11 petition
if he or she wants to avoid a Chapter 7 liquidation but fails the Chapter 13
eligibility requirements. Even among Chapter 11 filings in which an individual
seeks to preserve a sole proprietorship, it is difficult to study the effect of the
6 Matters have changed substantially in recent years. As LoPucki (2007) shows, three of the largest
corporate bankruptcies in U.S. history (Conseco, Inc., UAL Corp., and Kmart Corp.) were filed in
the Northern District of Illinois during 2002.
7 The database, Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), is available for a fee (http:/
/pacer.uscourts.gov). The Northern District waived the fee in my case.
8 The original list of filings was prepared at my request by the staff of the Northern District. The
list includes 185 filings, but one is actually a 1997 filing, which was dropped. The list also excludes
four creditor-initiated, involuntary Chapter 7 cases that were later converted to Chapter 11 cases.
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Table 1
Sample Selection
Petitions
Initial sample 184
Deletions or consolidations:
Business filings by individual debtors 30
Single-asset real estate cases 22
Nonbusiness filings by individuals 12
Firms using Chapter 11 to sell assets or settle a dispute 8
Sister companies 7
Firms dead on arrival 5
Publicly traded companies 2
Insufficient information 2
Simultaneous involuntary petition 1
Final sample 95
Note. There were 91 firms in the final sample.
code on asset reallocation. An individual’s right to a fresh start may prevent
liquidation of assets that would be sold off in a wealth-maximizing process.9
Corporations operating in the real estate sector are excluded because, like
individuals, their Chapter 11 filings are subject to special legal provisions, as
Klee (2002, pp. 1296–1302) explains. In addition, asset reallocation decisions are
often not at issue in cases involving real estate ventures. The owner of a piece
of real estate (often an office building) will use Chapter 11 to renegotiate debt
owed to a single creditor, a mortgagee. Whether the negotiations are successful
or not, the use of the real estate will not change. An office building, for example,
will generally continue to be used as an office building, regardless of the outcome
of the bankruptcy case.
As Table 1 shows, 42 filings by individuals and 22 filings by real estate ventures
were excluded from the sample. In addition, the sample omits eight filings by
businesses that entered Chapter 11 with the sole purpose of shutting down,
selling off assets, or resolving a dispute with a particular creditor. In each case,
the fate of the business was largely determined before it entered bankruptcy. In
one case, for example, a business entered Chapter 11 after sexual and racial
discrimination lawsuits were filed by two former employees. When it proposed
a plan of reorganization in which the employees would receive a small fraction
of their claims, they agreed to settle. With settlement in hand, the business had
its case dismissed (Chapter 11 debtors are free to seek dismissal at any time).
The sample also excludes filings by five businesses that had shut down before
filing their Chapter 11 petitions, two businesses about which insufficient infor-
mation was available, and one involuntary petition that was filed days before
the debtor filed its own voluntary petition (the petitions were consolidated by
9 To be sure, many corporations are privately held, and the owner-manager has personally guar-
anteed the business’s debt. The outcome of the corporate Chapter 11 case therefore affects the
owner’s personal wealth. The effect, however, is indirect. Because there is no fresh-start policy at
issue here, it is meaningful to think about shutting down a business by liquidating its assets.
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Table 2
Firm Characteristics for the Northern District and the 1998 Survey of
Small Business Finance (SSBF) Samples
Northern District SSBF
!20 employees, % 83.9 83.1
Age in years, median (mean) 6.9 (12.6) 13.0 (13.7)
Assets in dollars, median (mean) 114,160 (664,540) 320,971 (713,102)
Debt in dollars, median (mean) 511,752 (2,429,858) 191,660 (462,848)
Debt/assets, median (mean) 3.37 (16.82) .59 (.65)
Standard Industrial Classification number, %:
Construction (15–17) 12.6 11.2
Primary manufacturing (20–39) 10.5 11.7
Transportation (40–46, 48) 4.2 3.3
Wholesale trade (4813, 50–51) 3.2 11.3
Retail trade (52–59) 11.6 15.2
Eating and drinking places (58) 16.8 3.6
Insurance agents and real estate (60–69) 3.1 2.7
Business services (47, 49, 70–79) 21.1 23.9
Professional services (80–89) 16.8 17.1
Note. The samples exclude farming, mining, and real estate. Reported means for the SSBF sample are
estimates of population averages and were computed using survey weights. Reported medians are the 50th
percentile of the raw, unweighted data.
the bankruptcy court). The sample also consolidates filings by sister companies
(the court did so as well), which reduced the number of filings by seven.10 After
making these exclusions, the sample consists almost entirely of small, privately
held businesses. To preserve the homogeneity of the sample, filings by two large
publicly traded businesses were excluded as well. The final sample consists of
95 filings by 91 businesses (three businesses filed multiple petitions during 1998;
although each petition was counted separately,11 the analysis here would not
change in a meaningful way if the repeat filings were dropped).
2.2. Summary Statistics
The sample businesses are generally quite small, as Table 2 shows. While the
U.S. Small Business Administration (2001, p. 18 n. 1) defines a small business
as one with fewer than 500 employees, 81 percent of the businesses in this study
had fewer than 20 employees, and 96 percent had fewer than 100 employees.
In terms of capital structure, the businesses were similarly small. Nearly 50
percent had less than $100,000 in assets; 75 percent had less than $1 million.
Perhaps unsurprisingly for these types of businesses, most were young; in 63
percent of the cases, the business was less than 10 years old. They were also
10 For example, three outlets of one retailer filed separate Chapter 11 petitions. The court con-
solidated these petitions; so does this study.
11 Although counted separately, these petitions are treated as potentially correlated cases in the
statistical analysis, which computes robust standard errors that permit correlation across petitions
filed by the same business.
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owned and managed by a family or fewer than six investors (86 percent fell
within this category).
Although small, the businesses in this sample are not markedly different from
small businesses generally. Table 2 compares the Northern District sample to the
Federal Reserve Board’s 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF), a na-
tionally representative sample of businesses with 500 or fewer employees (see
Bitler, Robb, and Wolken 2001).12 In over 80 percent of the cases in the SSBF
sample and in the Northern District sample, the businesses have fewer than 20
employees. The industrial composition of both samples is also roughly com-
parable, the only noticeable differences being a smaller number of eating and
drinking places and a larger number of wholesale trade establishments in the
SSBF. These differences surely reflect the relatively high failure rates in some
industries, such as restaurants. They may also reflect the small size of the sample
studied here (95 filings by 91 businesses). Other important differences include
age (the median SSBF business is twice as old), asset size (sample businesses are
half as large), and leverage (five times as large in sample businesses). These
differences reflect, in part, the distressed condition of the sample businesses.
Most small businesses fail within the first 4–6 years of existence (Knaup 2005;
Bates and Nucci 1989); cash and other assets diminish and debt burdens mount
as they descend into bankruptcy.
The characteristics of the Northern District cases are typical of small-business
bankruptcies throughout the country. Table 3 compares the Northern District
sample to businesses in two recent surveys—the Warren and Westbrook (1999)
study of bankruptcy filings in the most and least active court in every judicial
circuit in 1994 and the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) database of all Chapter 11
cases closed during 1998 (see Federal Judicial Center 1998). Debt, asset, and
employment levels are similar across all surveys. For example, 68.4 percent of
businesses in the Northern District had less than $1 million in debt; the per-
centages from the Warren and Westbrook and FJC surveys are 65.7 percent and
73.4 percent, respectively. Industry demographics are somewhat comparable
across the surveys as well. Instead of the Standard Industrial Classification system,
Table 3 uses the industry classifications listed on the “face sheet” of the bank-
ruptcy petition.13 After sample selection (described in Table 1), Table 3 shows
that the sample employed here is roughly comparable, with a few exceptions,14
to those in other studies.
12 The survey excludes businesses operating in the agricultural, financial, and government sectors.
The 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances data can be downloaded from the Federal Reserve Board
Web site (http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/ssbf98/ssbf98home.html).
13 This classification is seriously flawed, both because it is quite crude and because debtors are
frequently unsure about the appropriate classification for their businesses. Nevertheless, it is used
in the vast majority of studies, including Warren and Westbrook (1998, pp. 529–30). It is the only
benchmark available.
14 As Table 3 shows, the Northern District survey contains fewer transportation and real estate
businesses and more professional and unclassified businesses than both the Warren and Westbrook
(1999) and Federal Judicial Center (1998) surveys. These differences, however, are largely a product
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2.3. Outcomes of Chapter 11 Cases
Thirty-six corporations—38 percent of the sample—emerged from bankruptcy
intact, either through a debt restructuring or a going-concern sale. As Table 4
illustrates, these continuations included 27 businesses that exited with a new
capital structure, either through a formal plan of reorganization or informal
renegotiation with key creditors (in which case, the business sought dismissal
of the Chapter 11 proceeding after achieving the renegotiation). Another nine
businesses underwent going-concern sales. Some sales were accomplished in the
context of a plan of reorganization; others were consummated under section
363 of the Bankruptcy Code (which allows sales of a business’s assets), and the
debtor sought dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7 when the sale was complete.
In 59 cases—62 percent of the sample—the business was shut down or forced
to exit Chapter 11 without a new capital structure, which in most cases resulted
in the corporation’s liquidation. As Table 4 shows, these shutdowns included 29
cases in which the debtor corporation was shut down and its assets distributed
to creditors, either in a Chapter 7 proceeding or in state law proceedings after
the case was dismissed. In the remaining 30 cases, the bankruptcy judge dismissed
the corporation’s bankruptcy petition and thereby exposed it to potential li-
quidation under state law. The judge dismissed these cases for a variety of reasons,
including the corporation’s failure to file financial schedules, pay fees, hire an
attorney, or show that it had a reasonable chance of reorganizing successfully.
In each case, the business exited without a new capital structure and was vul-
nerable to suit by creditors in state courts. As Table 5 illustrates, most businesses
suffered liquidation either immediately or soon after exiting bankruptcy. This
table assumes that a business operated for an entire year if any evidence—drawn
from Web sites, newspapers, public records maintained by the Illinois Secretary
of State, or subsequent bankruptcy petitions by the business or its owners—
suggests that the corporation operated at any point during that year.15
Most businesses ceased operations immediately or within 1 year of exiting
Chapter 11. Thus, for the majority of businesses, dismissal of a Chapter 11
petition is accompanied by a high probability of liquidation, much like a con-
version to Chapter 7. A judge will often dismiss a case, instead of converting it
to Chapter 7, if the debtor has no assets unencumbered by liens.16 With no assets
available to unsecured creditors, there is no benefit to a Chapter 7 proceeding,
which generates administrative costs.
of the sample selection methodology used here. The second column shows that, if Chapter 11 filings
by real estate enterprises and individuals are added back to the sample, the differences across the
samples decrease substantially.
15 If, for example, Illinois records indicate that a business dissolved during the second year after
exiting bankruptcy, I assumed the business was active both years. If state records indicate that the
business dissolved in the same year that it exited bankruptcy, I assumed the business was active
during that year only if other data sources confirmed the activity. Otherwise, I assumed the business
dissolved immediately after exiting.
16 Eugene R. Wedoff, former chief judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, personal interview with the author, December 3, 2002.
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Table 4
Case Dispositions, Sample Data
Legal Outcomes
TotalReorganization Dismissal
Conversion
to Chapter 7
Economic outcomes (Northern
District sample):
Continuations:
Exited with new capital structure 23 4 27
Going-concern sale 4 4 1 9
Totals 27 8 1 36
Shutdowns:
Shut down before exiting
bankruptcy 10 19 29
Exited without new capital
structure 30 30
Totals 0 40 19 59
Note. Jurisdiction statistics are derived from data on voluntary Chapter 11 cases that terminated in 1998
and involved corporations that had assets worth less than $10 million and were not classified as farming,
real estate, or stockbroker.
The outcomes observed in the Northern District are not atypical among bank-
ruptcy courts. This can be verified using the FJC databases, which contain in-
formation on outcomes in all bankruptcy courts. Table 6 shows that the likelihood
of reorganization in the Northern District is nearly identical to the national
average for small businesses.17
2.4. Duration of Chapter 11 Cases
It takes time for the Chapter 11 process to separate businesses that should be
continued from those that should be shut down. The longer this process takes,
the greater the cost to debtors and creditors. Among businesses that are ultimately
continued, Chapter 11 generates direct administrative costs, such as fees paid to
attorneys, trustees, and other professionals, most of which will be paid from the
debtor’s assets. These costs increase with the duration of the case.18 Among
businesses that are ultimately shut down, Chapter 11 generates both direct ad-
ministrative costs and indirect resource allocation costs. The longer it takes to
shut down an economically distressed business, the greater the delay in reallo-
cating the business’s assets to a third party who can put them to better use. This
lost value decreases returns to creditors. Case duration, then, is an important
benchmark for the costliness of the Chapter 11 process.
17 Relative rates of dismissal or conversion do differ significantly, however, with the Northern
District dismissing more cases and converting fewer.
18 Direct costs could be assessed more directly by gathering data on fees incurred by professionals.
I look only at case duration in this paper because fee data are generally unavailable or highly
incomplete in cases that result in dismissal (42 percent of the sample) or conversion to Chapter 7
(20 percent).
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Table 5
Postbankruptcy Experience of Firms That Exited without a
New Capital Structure ( )Np 30
Frequency (%)
Evidence of shutdown:
No evidence of postexit operations 12
No evidence of operations more
than 1 year after exiting 7
Total 19 (63.3)
Evidence of continuation:
Survived more than 1 year 10
Sold off as going concern within 1
year of exiting 1
Total 11 (36.7)
Case duration is remarkably short in the Northern District, as Table 7 illus-
trates. Among the 36 businesses that were continued, nearly two-thirds exited
in less than 1 year. More surprisingly, the Chapter 11 process identified over 70
percent of nonviable businesses within 6 months; 44 percent were identified
within 3 months. Only 8.5 percent of cases involving nonviable businesses (five
cases) were still ongoing after 1 year. Relative to any reasonable benchmark, a
process that determines the fate of a business within 5 months is quick. Various
business brokerages, for example, report that a period of between 4 and 9 months
is typically needed to sell a business.19 Auctions in other contexts, such as Federal
Communications Commission spectrum auctions (Cramton 1997), typically re-
quire a similar amount of time.
The Northern District’s speed may be atypical among bankruptcy courts gen-
erally. Table 8 uses FJC (1998, 1999) data to compare case duration in the
Northern District with the duration in other jurisdictions. Unlike Table 7, which
measures duration from case filing to confirmation, dismissal, or conversion,
Table 8 measures duration from filing to case closure. This is the only way to
measure duration in the FJC data. Case closure, however, typically occurs months
or even years after confirmation or conversion. The delay is caused by efforts
to determine the claims and relative priority of creditors (especially in cases
resulting in confirmation), sell assets, and recover preferential transfers.20 These
efforts may be an important part of determining how the value of the business
is divided among claimants, but they have no bearing on the key economic
decision about how the business’s assets are deployed. That decision is made
19 Some examples include Sunbelt, Sell a Business: FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) (http://
www.sunbeltnetwork.com/sell-business/faq.jsp), which reports that a period of 60–180 days is often
needed to conduct a liquidation, and Brookmoor Adams Advisors, Frequently Asked Questions (http:
//www.brookmooradams.com/faq.htm), which reports a duration of 6–9 months.
20 For example, in a separate study of Northern District cases, Baird and Morrison (2005a, p. 968)
found that most adversary proceedings were brought after confirmation or conversion. An adversary
proceeding is a bankruptcy procedure for recovering prebankruptcy payments to favored creditors
or other parties, disputing the validity or dischargeability of debt, and other limited purposes. An
adversary proceeding can greatly delay case closure.
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Table 6
Case Dispositions, %: Federal Judicial Center (1998, 1999) Data
Jurisdiction Reorganization Dismissal
Conversion
to Chapter 7
Northern District ( )Np 470 33.2 43.6 23.2
All jurisdictions ( )Np 13,457 30.7 29.9 39.4
Note. Statistics are derived from data on voluntary Chapter 11 cases that terminated in 1998 and involved
corporations that had assets worth less than $10 million and were not classified as farming, real estate, or
stockbroker.
when the court confirms, dismisses, or converts the case. Nonetheless, no com-
prehensive studies have looked closely at the duration to these events. They have
instead looked at the duration to case closure.
Using data on duration to case closure, Table 8 shows that, among cases
resulting in confirmation, the median duration in the Northern District was
significantly shorter (at the 1 percent level) than the median duration nationally.
The opposite, however, is true for cases resulting in dismissal. In contrast to
both of these figures, the median duration to conversion does not differ signif-
icantly between the Northern District and the rest of the nation. Taken together
with the statistics on outcomes by jurisdiction in Table 4, these observations
suggest that, relative to other jurisdictions, the Northern District reorganizes
about as many businesses but does so more quickly, dismisses more businesses
but does so more slowly, and converts fewer cases but does so in about the same
amount of time. Overall, decision making in the Northern District is faster than
that in other jurisdictions. The analysis that follows should be viewed with these
differences in mind.21
3. Continuation Bias in Chapter 11 Cases
Traditional accounts of Chapter 11, such as LoPucki (1983), argue that the
bankruptcy process is biased in favor of preserving businesses that are econom-
21 Among the possible reasons for faster decision making in the Northern District, the most likely
seems to be its motion practice, which is different from other courts. The Northern District permits
the parties to a case to schedule motions (for example, a debtor’s motion to use cash collateral or
a creditor’s motion to lift the automatic stay). In addition, motions are presented orally to the judge,
who typically renders a decision by the end of the hearing (Eugene R. Wedoff, former chief judge
of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, personal interview with
the author, December 3, 2002; Squires 1998). Because only 2 days’ notice is required for most
motions, a party can file a motion and receive a decision in days. (U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois [2003, rules 9013-1–9] explains that the notice period is enlarged to 20
days for motions proposing the sale of assets outside the ordinary course, conversion to Chapter 7
or dismissal, and other significant events. See also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002[a]). Opposing counsel need
not draft a response; he or she may present an argument orally to the judge. As a result, the judge’s
decision will be based not only on the paper record but also on open-ended discussion with the
parties. Judges can respond quickly to news that a business is failing. By contrast, in other jurisdictions
motions are filed with the court clerk, opportunity is given for opposing counsel to draft a response,
and the judge often renders a decision without conducting a hearing. Weeks or months may pass
before a motion is decided.
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Table 7
Duration to Confirmation, Conversion, or Dismissal of Chapter 11 Cases
in the Northern District Sample
Duration
% All Cases
( )Np 95
% Continuations
( )Np 36
% Shutdowns
( )Np 59
≤1 month 4.2 .0 6.8
≤3 months 31.6 11.1 44.1
≤6 months 51.6 19.4 71.2
≤9 months 76.8 58.3 88.1
≤12 months 81.1 63.9 91.5
Median duration (months) 5.7 8.3 3.4
ically distressed and should be liquidated immediately. This continuation bias,
it is thought, arises from the control incumbent managers exercise over the
bankruptcy process. The opposite bias could, of course, arise if creditors control
the bankruptcy process. Seeking immediate payment, creditors could push the
process toward liquidation of viable businesses.
Data from the Northern District offer three methods for testing whether the
Chapter 11 process exhibits either bias. One is based on the procedural history
of the bankruptcy case: if managers exercise significant control over the Chapter
11 process, creditors should have little success in terminating a case—through
dismissal, conversion to Chapter 7, or lifting the automatic stay—without in-
cumbent managers’ consent. If, instead, creditors control the bankruptcy process,
we should see frequent, successful motions to terminate a case. A second test is
based on the postbankruptcy history of reorganized businesses: if a substantial
number fail and subsequently reenter bankruptcy, managers may have sufficient
control over the process to prevent liquidation of nonviable businesses.22 A third
test is based on a comparison of businesses that are shut down in bankruptcy
with those that exit intact: if these businesses are indistinguishable, the bank-
ruptcy process may be catering to creditors (who force shutdown of viable
businesses) or debtors (who force continuation of nonviable businesses). The
following sections implement each test. As applied to the Northern District data,
none of the tests points to the presence of significant continuation bias.
3.1. A Test Based on Procedural History
Continuation bias might be inferred from one party’s dominance of the pro-
cess. LoPucki (1983), for example, found in his 1981 study of Chapter 11 cases
filed in St. Louis that the debtor was “in full control” because bankruptcy judges
were passive and prevented creditors from exercising any meaningful influence
22 Hotchkiss (1995) and LoPucki and Kalin (2001) apply a similar test to study bias in the Chapter
11 cases of large, publicly traded corporations. An even better test is one that tracks the assets of
troubled businesses (including businesses that do not resort to Chapter 11) and evaluates their
productivity before and after the distress is resolved (either in or outside of a bankruptcy proceeding).
Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) develop such a test. Data limitations make it impossible to implement
it here.
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Table 8
Duration in Months to Case Closure in the Federal Judicial Center Data, 1998–99
Jurisdiction
Case Outcome
All Cases Reorganization Dismissal Conversion
Northern District:
Median duration 18.9 21.4 12.0 51.1
Closed within 12 months (%) 31.1
Closed within 24 months (%) 57.9
All cases:
Median duration 27.6 29.4 9.4 49.7
Closed within 12 months (%) 23.4
Closed within 24 months (%) 45.1
Note. Statistics are derived from data on voluntary Chapter 11 cases that closed in 1998 and involved
corporations that had assets worth less than $10 million and were not classified as farming, real estate, or
stockbroker.
over the process. There is no evidence of similar control—either by debtors or
creditors—in the Northern District data. As Tables 9 and 10 illustrate, a party
other than the debtor was responsible for nearly 68 percent of all shutdowns.
Here a shutdown motion is defined narrowly as a motion to dismiss or convert
a case to Chapter 7. Under this definition, about one-third of all shutdowns are
voluntary decisions by the debtor, who moved to dismiss or convert its own
Chapter 11 filing. But this number is an overestimate because in nine cases (15.3
percent of shutdowns) the debtor filed a shutdown motion after the court granted
creditor motions to lift the automatic stay and seize core assets of the business.
For these debtors, there was no meaningful choice other than to file a motion
to convert or dismiss their petitions. These motions then arguably reflect creditor
control over the bankruptcy process. If we add them to the motions actually
filed by creditors and trustees, we find that a party other than the debtor was
actually or effectively responsible for 83 percent of all shutdowns. Thus, debtors
did not dominate the process.
Nor did creditors or the U.S. trustee dominate the bankruptcy process. Courts
frequently denied creditors’ motions to lift the automatic stay, dismiss or convert
a case to Chapter 7, or achieve other relief that would lead to shutdown. For
example, creditors filed these motions in 67.7 percent of shutdowns (40 cases;
see Table 10), but judges granted them in only 42 percent of the cases (25 cases;
see Table 9). More strikingly, creditors filed at least one shutdown motion in
58.4 percent of continuations (21 cases; see Table 10). Obviously, all of these
motions were denied; the debtor business exited intact. The U.S. trustee filed
similar, unsuccessful motions in 22.3 percent of continuations. These statistics
strongly suggest that no party with a predictable bias—debtors or creditors—
completely dominates the bankruptcy process; to the contrary, bankruptcy judges
appear to play an important role in determining when a business should be shut
down.
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Table 9
Party Filing Final, Successful Shutdown Motion
Party Filing Motion
% Shutdowns
( )Np 59
Debtor:
Filed after court granted creditor’s lift-stay motion 15.3
Other cases 17.0
Total 32.3
U.S. trustee:
Filed after court granted creditor’s lift-stay motion 20.3
Other cases 40.7
Total 61.0
Creditors:
Filed successful shutdown motion 6.8
Filed lift-stay motion, inducing another party’s
shutdown motion 35.6
Total 42.4
U.S. trustee or creditors 67.7
U.S. trustee or creditors, including cases in which debtor
acted in response to successful lift-stay motion 83.1
3.2. A Test Based on Postbankruptcy History
A bias might be present if the Chapter 11 process preserved businesses that
failed soon after exiting bankruptcy. Table 11 addresses this possibility; it presents
data on the postbankruptcy experience of the 27 businesses that exited Chapter
11 as independent entities with new capital structures (going-concern sales are
excluded).23 In 23 of these cases, the business exited after confirming a plan of
reorganization; in the remaining cases, the businesses voluntarily dismissed their
Chapter 11 petitions after settling disputes with creditors or identifying new
investors. Among the 27 businesses that exited intact, 12 eventually failed. Only
six, however, failed within 1 year, and seven within 2 years. These percentages
may seem large, but they are fairly typical of small businesses. Holmes and
Schmitz (1995) find that the annual hazard of discontinuing a business is around
20 percent even for businesses over 10 years old. Thus, nothing in the (admittedly
small) sample here offers compelling evidence that the Chapter 11 process er-
roneously preserved any of these businesses.
3.3. A Test Based on the Characteristics of Shutdowns versus Continuations
Continuation bias might be present if the Chapter 11 process indiscriminately
shut down businesses that were clearly worth saving. Tables 12 and 13 address
23 Data for Table 11 are based primarily on Illinois public records. If these records indicated that
a business dissolved during a particular year, I assumed the business shut down in that year. If Illinois
records indicated that a business was still in operation, or if the records were incomplete, I called
the business and verified that it was still in operation.
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Table 10
Motions Filed by Trustees and Creditors
Party Filing Motion ≥2 At least 1
Trustee:
% Shutdowns 5.1 61.0
% Continuations 5.6 22.3
% All cases 5.3 46.3
Creditors:
% Shutdowns 35.5 67.7
% Continuations 25.1 58.4
% All cases 31.6 63.9
Note. For shutdowns, Np 59; for continuations, Np 36;
for all cases, N p 95.
this possibility.24 A business should be preserved if it suffers financial, not eco-
nomic, distress. Because financial and economic distress are hard to distinguish
empirically, Table 12 reports the frequency with which certain markers of eco-
nomic distress were observed in the sample businesses. A business in economic
distress cannot rescue its business in Chapter 11. Nonetheless, the business may
enter bankruptcy in order to delay liquidation, extract concessions from creditors,
or gamble on the business’s resurrection (see Baird and Morrison 2005b). To
accomplish these goals, a business in economic distress will often ignore pro-
cedural requirements, suspend payment for ongoing expenses, and try to divert
value to insiders. I call these markers of economic distress.
Table 12 reports the frequency with which businesses exhibited these markers.
Here I code a business as exhibiting a particular marker only if, in response to
the marker, the court dismissed the case or converted it to Chapter 7.25 Among
businesses that were shut down, about 79 percent exhibited obvious markers of
economic distress. It appears then that the Chapter 11 process is generally liq-
uidating businesses that merit liquidation.
A similar story is told by Table 13, which reports the frequency with which
markers of financial distress were observed in the sample businesses. A business
suffering financial, not economic, distress would be profitable but for its debt
burden, which it shoulders as a result of unexpected shocks or past mistakes.
Unexpected shocks include cash shortages from the bankruptcy of a major cus-
tomer; past mistakes include overexpansion, cost overruns, malfeasance of former
managers, and torts.26 Among businesses that exited bankruptcy intact, 71 percent
exhibited these indicators of financial distress. Forty percent were recovering
from overexpansion; about 9 percent suffered temporary cash shortages from
24 Here the sample is limited to the 91 unique businesses in the sample; of these, 56 were shut
down.
25 Baird and Morrison (2005b) present additional detail on the methodology for coding the cases.
26 These data were obtained from documents filed by the debtor business. Typically, a motion to
use cash collateral, disclosure statement, or other filing would contain at least a paragraph describing
the reasons for the debtor’s distress.
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Table 11
Postbankruptcy Experience of Firms That Exited with
New Capital Structures
Postbankruptcy
Experience
Reorganizations
( )Np 23
Reorganizations
and Dismissals
( )Np 27
% Frequency % Frequency
Failed within 1 year 17.4 4 22.2 6
Failed in 1–2 years 4.3 1 3.7 1
Failed 2 years later 17.4 4 18.5 5
Total failures 39.1 9 44.4 12
the loss of customers who had gone bankrupt or breached significant contracts;
another 9 percent suffered cash shortages because they had underestimated the
costs of reconfiguring assets (converting a restaurant to a lounge would be an
example). These indicators of financial distress also characterized about 25 per-
cent of businesses that were shut down.27 But most of these businesses exhibited
markers of both financial and economic distress. Only about 10 percent of
shutdowns exhibited markers of financial distress but no markers of economic
distress. Together, these figures suggest that the Chapter 11 process in the
Northern District did not systematically preserve nonviable businesses or liq-
uidate viable ones.
4. A Formal Test of Continuation Bias
A basic task of the Chapter 11 process is to distinguish—filter—viable busi-
nesses worth reorganizing from nonviable businesses that should be shut down
(see White 1994). As Table 4 illustrates, the debtor exited bankruptcy intact in
only 36 of the 95 Chapter 11 petitions filed in the Northern District—less than
40 percent. The bankruptcy process therefore filters the bulk of filings into
liquidation. Filtering is typically accomplished by granting the motion of a cred-
itor or the U.S. trustee to lift the automatic stay and allow seizure of core assets,
to dismiss the case and allow creditors to resort to their state law remedies, or
to convert the case to Chapter 7 and commence liquidation. As Tables 9 and
10 illustrate, these motions are made repeatedly during a Chapter 11 case before
a judge finally grants one. In this section, I develop a model of optimal filtering
27 This percentage understates the frequency with which shutdowns exhibited markers of financial
distress. Case files are much less extensive for businesses that are shut down than for businesses that
exit intact. The document with the most detailed information about the business—the disclosure
statement—is filed only when the debtor has assembled a plan of reorganization. But a plan of
reorganization is rarely assembled in cases that result in shutdown. In these cases, markers of financial
distress must instead be inferred from motions filed by the debtor (for example, motions to use
cash collateral). If motions are not filed, or if they do not contain adequate information about the
business’s financial history, it is impossible to determine whether the business exhibited markers of
financial distress.
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Table 12
Evidence of Economic Distress
% Frequency
Ignored procedural requirements 62.5 35
Failed to pay ongoing expenses 26.8 15
Using Chapter 11 to favor insider creditors 1.8 1
Any evidence of economic distress 78.6 44
and use its implications as a benchmark for evaluating outcomes in the Northern
District.
4.1. A Simple Model of the Shutdown Decision
The process of filtering is analogous to a matching problem: the goal of the
bankruptcy system is to identify good matches between businesses and the op-
portunity to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. As conven-
tionally understood, good matches involve businesses whose going-concern value
exceeds their liquidation value (this is called going-concern surplus). Going-
concern surplus could derive from asset specificity, although Baird and Morrison
(2005b) argue that this is unlikely because most small businesses have few spe-
cialized assets other than the human capital of the owner-manager. Suplus could
instead derive from synergies between the owner-manager’s human capital and
the business’s physical capital. Or it could derive from the transactions costs
that would be incurred if the physical assets were reallocated. These costs might
exceed the additional return the assets would generate in another owner-
manager’s hands. Baird and Morrison (2005a) do not rule out these possibilities,
and this paper takes no position on the source of going-concern surplus in small
businesses. This paper assumes, instead, that judges are trying to preserve busi-
nesses with going-concern surplus, however defined. This may not be the socially
optimal goal, especially if surplus is absent from all businesses, but it is the goal
that the Bankruptcy Code directs judges to pursue.28 If data show that judicial
behavior is in fact consistent with pursuit of this goal, the data provide additional
evidence that judges do not display a systematic bias in favor of continuing or
liquidating small businesses.
A business’s going-concern value will be uncertain at the outset of a bank-
ruptcy case. This uncertainty will gradually decline as information is retrieved.
As uncertainty declines and the parties update their beliefs regarding the value
of the business, they must decide whether reorganization efforts should continue
or terminate. If termination is most attractive, creditors and the U.S. trustee will
file motions to dismiss the case, convert to Chapter 7, or lift the automatic stay
28 See, for example, United States v. Whiting Pools (462 U.S. 198, 202 [1983]): “By permitting
reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy
creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners. . . . Congress presumed that the assets of
the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap.’”
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Table 13
Evidence of Financial Distress
Shutdowns
( )Np 59
Continuations
( )Np 36
% Frequency % Frequency
Overexpansion 8.5 5 40.0 14
Prepetition fraud or malfeasance 3.4 2 8.6 3
Cash shortages from loss of customers 10.2 6 8.6 3
Cost overruns from reconfiguring business 3.4 2 11.4 4
Asbestos liability .0 0 2.9 1
Any evidence of financial distress 25.4 15 71.4 25
Any evidence of financial distress, excluding
cases exhibiting economic distress 10.2 6 71.4 25
to permit seizure of core assets. A debtor too may realize that its prospects are
poor and voluntarily seek dismissal or conversion. This is likely when neither
outside lenders nor existing creditors will offer additional financing. A judge will
generally grant a debtor’s motion to dismiss or convert; under the code, a debtor
can initiate or terminate a case at will, with some exceptions. A creditor’s motion
will be granted only after the judge independently assesses the value of the
business.
This process can be studied formally using a simple matching model29 drawn
from the optimal stopping and job search literatures30 and set out in the Ap-
pendix. This model allows us to identify characteristics of an ideal bankruptcy
process that optimally filters good from bad matches as information about busi-
ness quality is updated over time. For analytic convenience, the model assumes
that a wealth-maximizing planner (called, for convenience, the judge) runs the
process. In reality, of course, the outcomes of the bankruptcy process are de-
termined by negotiation and bargaining among debtors, creditors, trustees, and
judges. The model merely provides a theoretical benchmark against which we
can evaluate bankruptcy outcomes and test for the presence of continuation
bias.
Two important implications emerge from this model. First, if a business’s
estimated going-concern value at filing (G) is not significantly above or below
its liquidation value (L), the outcome of its Chapter 11 case should be correlated
with the degree of uncertainty (U) surrounding the going-concern value. The
greater the uncertainty, the longer the bankruptcy process should continue before
the shutdown option is exercised. This is an options effect and reflects the
29 The process could also be analyzed using a real options model. The implications are roughly
the same, as Baird and Morrison (1999) show. Chen and Sundaresan (2003) develop a more general
model of the shutdown decision and extend it to consider debtor-in-possession financing.
30 These literatures study the optimal time to terminate an ongoing process; applications include
a business’s decision to abandon a troubled project (Dixit and Pindyck 1994), a worker’s decision
to discontinue job search (Jovanovic 1979), and a counterparty’s decision to repudiate an ongoing
contract (Triantis and Triantis 1998).
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asymmetric effect of uncertainty in this context. The greater the uncertainty, the
greater the probability the business will prove to be a good match tomorrow.
There is, of course, a higher probability that the business will prove to be a bad
match, but the business’s assets can be sold if this happens. The business’s
liquidation value offers a hedge against the downside risk from waiting to liq-
uidate.31 All else equal, then, the greater the uncertainty surrounding business
value, the longer a business should spend in Chapter 11.
This options effect, however, will be absent in cases in which the business’s
going-concern value G is significantly above or below its liquidation value L. If
G is significantly above L, it is virtually certain that the business will be reor-
ganized or restructured in bankruptcy. The probability of shutdown will be zero
or close to it, and the business will exit bankruptcy quickly. Conversely, if G is
significantly below L, the business will be shut down immediately.
The second implication of the model is that the probability (or hazard rate)
of exercising the shutdown option should be hump shaped over time—low
initially, then rising, and ultimately declining.32 The probability should be low
when a business first enters the bankruptcy process because uncertainty is high.
As information is obtained and uncertainty resolved, the parties (debtor, cred-
itors, judge) should have stronger incentives to exercise the option. The prob-
ability of shutdown will therefore rise as ventures with no viability are discovered
and abandoned. Once the shutdown option is exercised in these cases, however,
the only remaining ventures will be those with relatively high profitability (for
them, the shutdown option is “out of the money”) or those with highly uncertain
profitability. Some of these businesses will never be shut down; others will be
shut down only after a delay, during which the decision maker gathers infor-
mation about the businesses’ viability. Thus, the probability of shutdown should
fall gradually over time. This is a selection effect.33
These two implications—the options effect and the selection effect—provide
simple yet theoretically coherent benchmarks for evaluating existing practice in
bankruptcy courts.
4.2. Evidence of the Selection Effect
The selection effect is evident in Figure 1, which shows a hump-shaped prob-
ability of shutdown. The likelihood of shutdown (displayed in black bars) in-
31 Guiso and Parigi (1999) show that this implication can be reversed under certain conditions,
although they find the options effect in their empirical work. The effect has also been observed in
other studies, including Moel and Tufano (2002) and Ghosal and Loungani (2000).
32 Technically, the hump shape will characterize the probability (or hazard) of shutdown only if
the value of the venture (going-concern value) is at least as great as its liquidation value when the
decision maker first considers whether to exercise the shutdown option. Otherwise, the business will
be shut down immediately. In the context of Chapter 11, this means that a hump-shaped pattern
will be observed if most businesses file petitions only when their value as going concerns is at least
as great as their liquidation values (that is, few businesses file petitions when they are destined to
be shut down immediately by the bankruptcy judge).
33 This effect has been verified empirically in work applying matching models to labor markets
(see, for example, Lane and Parkin 1998).
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Figure 1. Months to exit: frequencies for shutdowns and continuations
creases during the first 3 months of a bankruptcy petition, reaches a maximum
around 3 months, and then falls. Using a normal approximation to the binomial,
as suggested by Chapman and Southwick (1991), the increase from months 1
to 3 and the decrease from months 3 to 9 are both significant at the 5 percent
confidence level. Figure 2 plots the monthly hazard rate of shutdown, which is
computed as the ratio of the number of businesses shut down to the number
of businesses not yet shut down in each month.34 Here, the increase from months
1 to 3 is significant at the 5 percent level; the decrease from months 3 to 9 is
significant at the 10 percent level.
The hump-shaped pattern suggests an absence of continuation bias. This
evidence must, of course, be seen in conjunction with the rest. By itself, the
hump-shaped pattern is not conclusive; processes could produce it as well. Sup-
pose, for example, that Northern District bankruptcy judges flip coins to de-
termine a business’s fate and that, for some reason, most judges flip their coins
when the case reaches the 3-month mark but some flip it earlier and some later.
A decision-making rule of this sort would yield a similar hump-shaped pattern.
But this sort of rule is inconsistent with the evidence presented in the previous
sections, which shows that Northern District judges sort effectively between viable
and nonviable businesses. Viewed in light of this evidence, the hump-shaped
patterns in Figures 1 and 2 offer additional reason to believe that continuation
bias is absent in the Northern District.
34 I code a business as not yet shut down even if it has left the sample because it has been reorganized.
I am implicitly assuming that such a business, which was cured of its financial distress, would not
have been shut down even if it remained in bankruptcy for an extended period.
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Figure 2. Months to exit: hazard rate for shutdowns
4.3. Evidence of the Options Effect
Three variables drive the options effect: a business’s estimated going-concern
value (G), the uncertainty surrounding that estimate (U), and the liquidation
value of the business’s assets (L). If the difference between G and L is not large,
an increase in U should increase the amount of time that a business spends in
Chapter 11. It could also increase the probability that a business exits bankruptcy
intact, but only if the business is reorganized or sold off at a point when significant
uncertainty about its viability remains. This might occur, for example, if the
parties to the bankruptcy process believe that it is cheaper to monitor the busi-
ness’s viability outside of Chapter 11.
4.3.1. Proxies for Key Variables
The variable L can be estimated using a debtor’s financial schedules, which
offer rough estimates (usually book value) of the value of its assets. We can,
however, develop only rough proxies for G and U. The bankruptcy filings provide
only cursory information about the prepetition financial performance of these
privately held businesses. Proxies for U can be derived from the observed vol-
atility surrounding earnings of businesses in the same industry. One such proxy
is the standard deviation of monthly returns on a portfolio of publicly traded
businesses in the same industry.35 This variable (Stockmarket Volatility) assumes
35 The proxy is computed using data from 1995–97, the 3 years prior to the bankruptcy filings in
this study (a 3-year window appears to be a standard time frame for assessing volatility). The stock
return data were taken from (French 2006).
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a (weak) correlation between the volatility surrounding the earnings of publicly
traded businesses and those of privately held businesses in the same industry.
Another proxy for U is the cross-sectional variation in profitability among
small businesses in the same industry (and the same metropolitan area), which
can be derived from the 1998 SSBF data. Because it uses data on small busi-
nesses—the focus of this paper—this measure (SSBF Volatility) has advantages
relative to stock market volatility. On the other hand, the latter measure is
theoretically more attractive because it is based on variation in profitability within
businesses over time, not profitability across businesses at a single point in time.
A final proxy for U is the proportion of small businesses within a particular
industry that “die” each year (Industry Attrition Rate). The U.S. Census Bureau
offers dynamic data tracking the births and deaths of small businesses over time.36
Deaths are defined as closures, which could result from liquidation or from
merger with another business. Using these data, we can derive an average prob-
ability (over the period 1995–97) that a business within a particular industry
will die over the course of a year. This measure is a useful proxy for U because
it offers a rough measure of the relative risk of shutdown across industries.
Proxies for going-concern value (G) are harder to find. If we assume that a
business’s going-concern value is correlated with industry conditions, one proxy
for a business’s G is the growth rate of earnings, employment, or number of
businesses in the same industry. If an industry is growing relatively fast, businesses
in that industry may have relatively high going-concern values.
An alternative measure of G is whether the sample business entered bankruptcy
as a result of overexpansion. As noted before, such a business is likely suffering
financial distress and may have going-concern surplus if it scales back its op-
erations. Another, similar measure is whether the sample business, after entering
bankruptcy, filed a motion to use cash collateral. Many businesses have given
lenders security interests in cash and accounts receivable. To access these sources
of liquidity, the businesses must obtain permission from either the lenders or
the court. In practice, courts are reluctant to grant permission over the objection
of lenders.37 Knowing this, debtor businesses rarely file motions to use cash
collateral without first obtaining the lenders’ permission. The filing of a motion
to use cash collateral, then, offers some evidence that both the debtor and its
primary creditors believe that the business has value as a going concern.
The difficulty with these proxies is that not all sample businesses with sig-
nificant going-concern surplus will have suffered overexpansion problems or
need to file motions to use cash collateral. Thus, these proxies identify only some
of the businesses with relatively high values for G.
36 Dynamic data on establishment births and deaths are constructed by the U.S. Census Bureau
for the United States Small Business Administration. See United States Small Business Administration,
Office of Advocacy, Firm Size Data (http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/data.html). For more infor-
mation, see Armington (1998).
37 Eugene R. Wedoff, former chief judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, personal interview with the author, December 3, 2002.
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These variables—L, G, and U—are not the only plausible factors affecting the
likelihood of shutdown in bankruptcy. Another factor is the business’s liquidity,
as measured by cash holdings at the beginning of the case. Businesses with
significant cash holdings are less dependant on outside sources of liquidity and
may be able to survive longer in Chapter 11. Another factor is the degree of
creditor control, which can affect the amount of time a business spends in
bankruptcy. I use several proxies for creditor control: leverage (debt divided by
assets), the extent to which the business’s assets are encumbered by security
interests, and whether the owner personally guaranteed the business debts. Other
factors that may affect the shutdown decision are business characteristics (age,
prior bankruptcy experience) and whether the business complied with bank-
ruptcy procedures (by, for example, filing the requisite schedules).
4.3.2. Univariate Tests
An initial look at these variables is set out in Tables 14 and 15. Table 14
compares businesses that exited before and after the median case duration. The
median duration for shutdowns was 4 months. The median duration for the
full sample was 6 months. Table 15 compares shutdowns with businesses that
exited intact.
The proxies for U offer mixed results. Table 14 shows that two proxies—
stockmarket volatility and SSBF volatility—are larger among cases where the
duration to shutdown or exit exceeded the median (I call these “slow shutdowns”
and “slow exits”). This is consistent with the options effect, but the results are
only marginally significant. The same pattern is evident in Table 15. The third
proxy for U—industry attrition—is larger among slow shutdowns than among
quick shutdowns, which is also consistent with the options effect. In the full
sample, we see the opposite pattern: industry attrition is larger among quick
than among slow exits (Table 14) and among shutdowns than among contin-
uations (Table 15). The differences, however, are not statistically significant.
The proxies for G are somewhat mixed as well. Industry growth—the average
annual increase in the number of businesses, by industry, during 1995–97—does
not vary significantly between quick and slow shutdowns or between quick and
slow exits (see Table 14) but is significantly larger among shutdowns than among
continuations (see Table 15). The same pattern emerges when we analyze the
average annual increase in employment, by industry, for the same period. This
may suggest that industry growth is a poor proxy for G, or it may reflect the
possibility that industries with high growth rates also have high earnings volatility
(the correlation with stockmarket volatility is .35). The other proxies for G—
overexpansion and motion to use cash collateral—exhibit patterns more con-
sistent with the matching model: they are larger on average in cases that resulted
in slow shutdown, slow exit, and continuation.
The remaining summary statistics in Tables 14 and 15 exhibit interesting
patterns. Table 14, for example, shows that quick shutdowns involved business
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Table 15
Differences between Shutdowns and Continuations
Shutdowns Continuations
Stock market volatility (U ) 4.177 (.070) 4.369# (.140)
SSBF volatility (U ) .178 (.002) .182 (.003)
Industry attrition rate (U ) 10.246 (.183) 9.885 (.286)
Industry growth rate (G) 1.393 (.146) .611** (.201)
Overexpansion problems (G) .119 (.042) .472** (.084)
Cash collateral motions (G) .407 (.065) .694** (.078)
Log assets (L) 11.458 (.232) 12.341* (.387)
Log cash holdings 6.819 (.457) 8.187 (.542)
Leverage (log debt/log assets) 1.155 (.019) 1.126 (.027)
Secured debt ≥ 75% of assets .593 (.065) .333* (.080)
Debt personally guaranteed .929 (.035) .829∧ (.065)
Under 5 years old .407 (.065) .222 (.070)
Proceeding without lawyer (pro se) .051 (.029) .028 (.028)
Prior bankruptcy within preceding 6 years .169 (.049) .111 (.053)
Prior bankruptcy in 1998 .051 (.029) .028 (.028)
Incomplete financial schedules .102 (.040) .0* (.0)
Note. Symbols indicate the statistical significance of the differences in means between shutdowns
and continuations. Standard errors are in parentheses. SSBF p 1998 Survey of Small Business
Finances.
∧Significant at the 15% level, two-tailed t-tests.
# Significant at the 10% level, one-tailed t-tests.
Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed t-tests.
* Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed t-tests.
** Significant at the 1% level, two-tailed t-tests.
that were relatively young, had smaller cash holdings, had larger secured debt
levels, and were more likely to have violated court rules (by not filing financial
schedules or by proceeding without a lawyer).
4.3.3. Multivariate Tests
Simple summary statistics offer some evidence supporting the existence of an
options effect. Multivariate analysis, displayed in Table 16, allows us to test this
effect with greater care.
Columns 1–7 of Table 16 analyze the duration of cases resulting in shutdown.
Columns 1 and 2 present a simple Cox model of the hazard rate, defined as the
probability of shutdown at time t conditional on avoiding shutdown until t.
Formally, the hazard rate h(t, ) is defined as h(t, , where is a
′x bX X)p h(0)e X
vector of regressors and is a vector of estimated coefficients. A negative co-b
efficient implies that a regressor reduces the hazard of shutdown or, equivalently,
increases the duration until shutdown. The Cox model is attractive largely be-
cause it makes no assumption about the shape of h(0), the baseline hazard rate.
Column 1 presents the results of a simple model in which the only covariates
are proxies for U, G, and L. Consistent with the univariate analysis in Table 15,
the coefficients on the proxies for U are uniformly negative, which implies that
an increase in uncertainty is correlated with longer case duration. The negative
coefficient is marginally significant for stock market volatility and industry at-
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trition. The third proxy—SSBF volatility—appears to have no independent pre-
dictive value. Column 2 shows that little or nothing changes in the model when
this variable is dropped (it is dropped in the remaining analysis as well). Overall
then, shutdown occurs later in time for businesses with relatively high indexes
of U. Columns 1 and 2 show also that various measures of going-concern surplus
are negatively correlated with the hazard rate, which is again consistent with the
theoretical model.
Column 3 augments the Cox model by adding other variables that may affect
the hazard of shutdown. The proxies for uncertainty remain negative but increase
in significance. Among the newly added variables, cash holdings and leverage
are strongly correlated with reductions in the hazard rate. Conversely, an increase
in the hazard rate is likely when a business proceeds without a lawyer or has
filed a bankruptcy petition in the preceding 6 years. These observations are
unchanged when we eliminate repeat filings by the same business during the
sample period (column 4).
Columns 5–7 test the robustness of these results by varying the underlying
distribution of the baseline hazard rate, h(0). Each column assumes a different
distribution: exponential (column 5), Weibull (6), and lognormal (7). The models
applying the exponential and Weibull distributions are models of the hazard
rate, so a negative coefficient implies that an increase in the regressor reduces
the hazard rate and increases case length. In contrast, the model applying the
lognormal distribution is a model of case length itself. Here the coefficients have
the opposite interpretation: a positive coefficient implies that an increase in the
regressor is correlated with a longer case length. Thus, the positive coefficients
in column 6 are consistent with the negative coefficients in the other columns.
Note that that the results in Columns 1–7 are based on the subset of cases
involving shutdowns ( ). Among these cases, the results show that theNp 59
greater the uncertainty surrounding business viability (U), the longer the business
is allowed to continue operations in Chapter 11. The downside of these models
is that they ignore cases in which the business exited bankruptcy intact.
Column 8 remedies this defect using a “cure,” or split-population, model (for
applications, see Berkson and Gage 1952; Schmidt and Witte 1989; Bandopa-
dhyaya and Jaggia 2001). This model assumes that all sample businesses—even
those that ultimately exited intact—were at risk of shutdown. Businesses that
exited intact—via a plan of reorganization or a going-concern sale—might have
been shut down had they lingered in Chapter 11. The cure model simultaneously
estimates the probability that a business will be shut down and the duration to
shutdown.
Formally, the likelihood function for the cure model is assembled as follows.
Following Schmidt and Witte (1989, pp. 148–49), let S be an unobservable
variable indicating whether a business will be shut down in bankruptcy if the
bankruptcy judge is given sufficient time to gather information about it. Let S
equal one if a business will be shut down and zero otherwise. Assume that the
probability that S equals one is d: and . Next,Pr (Sp 1)p d Pr (Sp 0)p 1 d
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let t measure the amount of time a business spends in bankruptcy before being
shut down. Assume that t is distributed according to some cumulative distri-
bution function G. Thus, the density of businesses that are shut down after t
months in bankruptcy is . Let C be a dummy variable equal to oneg(tFSp 1)
if the business exits bankruptcy intact and zero otherwise. The term C indicates
whether information about a business is censored: we know that the business
exited bankruptcy, but we do not know whether it would have been shut down
had it remained in bankruptcy. If a business exits bankruptcy without being shut
down, let T measure the amount of time the business spent in bankruptcy.
With these definitions in hand, we can assemble the likelihood function. We
observe two kinds of firms in the data: shutdowns (indexed by i) and contin-
uations (indexed by j). The probability of shutdown at time t is
Pr (Sp 1)g(tFSp 1)p dg(tFSp 1).i i
The probability of continuation is
F F( )Pr (Cp 1)p Pr (Sp 0)Pr (Sp 1) Pr t 1 T Sp 1j
( ) ( )p 1 d d 1 G TFSp 1 .[ ]j
Therefore, the likelihood function is
( ) ( ) ( )Lp dg tFSp 1  1 d d 1 G TFSp 1 ,[ ] [ ]  { }i j
i j
where sums over businesses shut down in bankruptcy ( ) and sums Cp 0 i j
over businesses that exited bankruptcy intact ( ). Estimates reported inCp 1
column 8 assume that G is a lognormal distribution, a standard assumption in
settings where the hazard rate is nonmonotonic, as it is here. The model also
assumes, for simplicity, that d is a scalar with logistic distribution.38
Column 8 shows that the estimates derived from this cure model are roughly
identical to those generated by a simple duration model with a lognormal baseline
hazard. Combined with the results in columns 1–7, these results offer suggestive
evidence in favor of the options effect.
Instead of studying the duration to shutdown, column 9 analyzes the prob-
ability of shutdown using a standard logit model. Here the subset of cases
resulting in shutdown is compared with the subset resulting in continuation.
The coefficients in column 9 measure the effect of changes in the control variables
on the probability of shutdown. The dependent variable equals one if a case
resulted in shutdown and zero otherwise. Interestingly, only one of the proxies
for uncertainty—stockmarket volatility—has the predicted negative effect. The
other proxy has a positive, but insignificant, coefficient. As in Table 15, proxies
for going-concern surplus also have mixed coefficients. An increase in industry
growth is strongly correlated with an increase in the probability of shutdown.
38 This simple model is estimated using Mario Cleve’s “lncure” program for STATA (http://
www.stata.com/users/mcleves/lncure/).
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The opposite is true for the other proxies, overexpansion problems and cash
collateral motion. The logit model then offers only mixed support for the options
effect. These results are unsurprising because it is hard to predict the effect of
uncertainty (U) in this model. The effect occurs only when the going-concern
value (G) is close to liquidation value (L). If G far exceeds L, a business will be
kept intact, regardless of U. In the sample, however, continuations include both
businesses in which G was close to L (where the options effect operates) as well
as those in which G far exceeded L (where the options effect is absent). This
heterogeneity may explain the mixed results in column 9.
Together, the patterns reported here are generally consistent with the hy-
pothesis that bankruptcy judges decide cases in order to identify and preserve
firms with going-concern surplus. The hazard of shutdown is hump shaped, a
business is more likely to exit bankruptcy intact if it has significant going-concern
value, and a business is more likely to be shut down quickly if there is relatively
little uncertainty about its value as a going concern. The conclusion does not
imply that the behavior of bankruptcy judges is optimal. Few, if any, businesses
in bankruptcy may have significant going-concern surplus worth saving (in the
form of specialized physical capital), as Baird and Morrison (2005b) have argued.
The results presented here show, instead, that judges act as if they are seeking
out and preserving going-concern surplus.
5. Conclusion
Evidence gathered from the Northern District of Illinois supports the hy-
pothesis that current practice in the bankruptcy courts exhibits no systematic
bias in favor of saving nonviable businesses. The debtor’s managers are not in
control, and businesses destined to fail are identified quickly. Viewed through
the lens of a formal matching model of the bankruptcy process, the data again
suggest that bias commonly ascribed to the Chapter 11 process is either absent
or empirically unimportant. The costs of small-business Chapter 11 cases are
smaller than commonly thought. Whether the benefits of Chapter 11 are large
enough to justify even these costs, however, is far from self-evident. A careful
examination of the benefits of Chapter 11 is also needed.39
39 Another paper, Baird and Morrison (2005b), uses data from the Northern District to address
this question as well. There we argue that the benefits of small-business Chapter 11 cases, like the
costs, are quite low, even when the business survives as a going concern.
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Appendix
A Matching Model of Chapter 11
Consider an idealized bankruptcy court that receives Chapter 11 petitions by
a large number of businesses every period. When a case begins, the business’s
liquidation value (R) is observable, but its going-concern value (V) is not. The
parties know only that a fraction, p, of the businesses have high going-concern
value (H) and are worth reorganizing. The remaining businesses are low-value
businesses (L) that should be liquidated.
Although going-concern value is unobservable at the outset, information is
revealed over the course of the case, which lasts two periods. During period 1,
the court receives a signal of business type. The signal is either good (g) or bad
(b). Good signals occur with probability pg, bad with probability pb. Assume
that good signals are more likely to arise from type H than from type L businesses:
. The reverse is true for bad signals, which are more likely to arisep 1 pgFH gFL
from type L than from type H businesses: . Note thatp 1 p p  p pbFL bFH gFH bFH
and .1 p  p p 1gFL bFL
At the end of period 1, after receiving the signal, the judge must decide whether
to liquidate the business or allow it to continue in operation, at least until the
next period. If the business is liquidated, the return to creditors is R. If it is
allowed to continue, the judge will receive an additional signal of business quality
in period 2. Again, the signal will be either g or b. After receiving this signal,
the judge has a final opportunity to liquidate the business. If the business is not
liquidated, it exits bankruptcy and operates for one more period, at the end of
which its true value (H or L) is revealed. If it is type H, the business is sold off
as a going concern and the payoff to creditor is H. If it is type L, the business
is liquidated, with a payoff to creditors.R 1 L
There is a cost to waiting. Every period, the parties incur administrative and
other costs equal to c. The judge fully internalizes these costs in his or her
decision-making calculus.
There is an opportunity, then, to liquidate a Chapter 11 debtor at the end of
each period. What is the optimal time to exercise this shutdown option? We can
characterize the optimal decision via backward induction.
Start with period 2. The judge’s decision depends on the signals received to
date. If the signals in periods 1 and 2 were {g, g}—meaning that good signals
were received in both periods—the best estimate of the business’s going concern
is
E(VFgg)p Pr (HFgg)HPr (LFgg)R,
where
2p pgFH
Pr (HFgg)p
2 2 ( )p p p 1 pgFH gFL
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and
2 ( )p 1 pgFL
Pr (LFgg)p ,
2 2 ( )p p p 1 pgFH gFL
using Bayes’s rule. Given this estimate of business value, the judge must decide
whether to liquidate the business immediately or allow it to continue to period
3. If it is liquidated, the return to creditors is ; if it is allowed to continue,R 2c
the expected return to creditors next period is . More formally, theE(VFgg) 3c
judge’s problem is
( )max E VFgg c, R .{ }
There is a threshold liquidation value such that the judge is indifferentR*gg
between liquidating and permitting continuation. If a business’s liquidation value
R exceeds , the business will be liquidated; if it is below , the business willR* R*gg gg
be preserved, at least temporarily. This threshold is equal to
1
R* p H c.gg Pr (HFgg)
Analogous expressions40 characterize the threshold liquidation value— , ,R* R*gb bg
and —when the judge has received different signals of business quality inR*bb
periods 1 and 2.
These period 2 thresholds have important characteristics. First, the thresholds
are larger for businesses with better histories: , becauseR* 1 R* p R* 1 R*gg gb bg bb
.41 This means that judges are lessPr (HFgg) 1 Pr (HFbg)p Pr (HFgb) 1 Pr (HFbb)
willing to terminate businesses that have generated better signals of quality. More
important, these thresholds are increasing in the variance of business quality,
. Holding average quality— —constant, var-2 2j p p(1 p)(H L) pH (1 p)L
iance in business quality increases as the difference between H and L increases.
Consider an increase in H and decrease in L that raises variance but holds average
quality constant. Since and all other thresholds are increasing in H, allR*gg
thresholds will rise. This property reflects the option value of liquidation. Al-
though increases in variance reduce the value of type L businesses, a judge can
avoid the downside risk by liquidating the business for payoff . Thanks toR 1 L
this insurance, an increase in variance can only increase the potential payoff to
creditors.
Turn now to period 1. At the end of the period, after observing a signal, the
40 and .R* p R* p H [1/ Pr (HFgb)] c R* p H [1/ Pr (HFbb)] cgb bg bb
41 If , then 2 2 2 2 2Pr (HFgg) 1 Pr (HFbb) [(p ) p]/[(p ) p (p ) (1 p)] 1 [(p ) p]/[(p ) pgFH gFH gFL bFH bFH
, which is equivalent to . The last inequality holds because2 2 2(p ) (1 p)] (p /p ) 1 (p /p )bFL bFL bFH gFL gFH
and . Similar calculations show that andp 1 p p ! p Pr (HFgg) 1 Pr (HFgb) Pr (HFgb) 1gFH gFL bFH bFL
.Pr (HFbb)
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judge has his or her first opportunity to liquidate the business. His or her problem
is
( )max E VFs c, R ,{ }
where s denotes the signal broadcast in period 1. The optimal decision depends
on the relationship between the period 2 thresholds , , and and theR* R* R*gg gb bb
business’s liquidation value R. We need to consider four cases.
Case 1: . This implies that, even if the business generates good signalsR 1 R*gg
in both periods 1 and 2, its liquidation value will still exceed its expected going-
concern value. Under these conditions, it makes sense to liquidate the business
immediately at the end of period 1. It makes no sense to permit continuation
because the judge will always liquidate the business at the end of period 2. The
history of signals will be irrelevant in light of the large payoff from liquidation.
Case 2: . Here the liquidation value of the business is so small thatR ! R*bb
it almost always makes sense to permit continuation. Suppose the judge permits
continuation. At the end of the next period—period 2—the judge will permit
continuation again, regardless of the history of signals, because the payoff to
creditors is so low. Given that continuation will be permitted at the end of period
2, it is optimal to permit continuation at the end of period 1 unless the liquidation
value R is close to the threshold .42 If it is close, the cost of waiting, c, swampsR*bb
the gains.
Case 3: . Under these conditions, a judge will liquidate a busi-R* ! R ! R*gb gg
ness at the end of period 2 if it broadcast a bad signal at any time. Knowing
this at the end of period 1, the judge will liquidate any business with a bad
period 1 signal. Suppose, then, that the business had a good period 1 signal.
The judge’s problem is
( )max Pr (gFg) E VFgg cPr (bFg)R c, R ,[ ]{ }
where and are the probabilities of good and bad signals in periodPr (gFg) Pr (bFb)
2, respectively, given a good signal in period 1. In this problem, liquidation is
optimal if R exceeds the threshold
1 1
R* p H  c,g3 [ ]p Pr (HFg) Pr (HFgg)gFH
which can be derived through repeated application of Bayes’s rule. This threshold
is clearly less than . It will also be greater than if the first term in bracketsR* R*gg gb
is not too large.
42 Suppose, for example, that the period 1 signal is b. Given that continuation will be permitted
in period 2, the judge’s problem is . The threshold liquidation value for thismax {E (VFb) 2c, R}
problem is . If , continuation will be permitted in both periods 1R* p H [2/ Pr (HFb)] c R ! R*b2 b2
and 2. By assumption, . As long as there is an R such that , then liquidation mayR ! R* R* ! R ! R*bb b2 bb
be optimal in period 1, even though it is not in period 2. Such a region exists if Pr (HFb)
.2 Pr (HFbb) ! 0
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Case 4: . Here the business will be kept intact at the end ofR* ! R ! R*bb gb
period 2 if it broadcasts a good signal at any time. Liquidation is optimal only
when a business broadcasts consistently bad signals. Knowing this at the end of
period 1, the judge will permit continuation of any business with a good period
1 signal, provided per-period costs are not too high.43 Suppose then that the
period 1 signal is b, which implies that the business will be preserved in period
2 only if the second signal is g. The judge solves
( )max Pr (gFb) E VFgb cPr (bFb)R c,R ,[ ]{ }
which yields the threshold
1 1
R* p H  c.b4 [ ]p Pr (HFb) Pr (HFgb)gFH
Thus, a business will avoid liquidation, even with a bad first-period signal, if R
is less than . Note that .R* R* ! R*b4 b4 g3
Given these thresholds, we can determine how the probability (and hazard)
of liquidation varies over the course of a case. To illustrate, assume that liqui-
dation is never optimal at the outset of the case, before any information has
been gathered. Recall that liquidation is optimal at the end of period 1, regardless
of the signal, if R exceeds or . To avoid immediate liquidation at the startR* R*gg g3
of the case, assume that R falls below these thresholds (ruling out case 1 and
part of case 3). Assume, in addition, that R is not so low that liquidation is
never optimal; we are interested in cases where liquidation is a real possibility.
Recall that liquidation is never optimal if R is less than or , provided per-R* R*bb b4
period costs are not large. Assume that R exceeds both thresholds and that costs
are low (ruling out case 2 and part of case 4).
These assumptions imply that the probability of liquidation is zero at the
beginning of period 1. The assumptions also imply that R falls within two possible
ranges: or .R* ! R ! R* R* ! R ! R*b4 gb gb g3
Consider region 1: . Here a business will be liquidated if theR* ! R ! R*b4 gb
period 1 signal is bad, which occurs with probability Pr (b)p p pbFH
. This means that, at the end of period 2, the only businesses will bep (1 p)bFL
those with good period 1 signals and either good or bad period 2 signals. None
of these businesses will be liquidated, because R is less than . The probabilityR*gb
of liquidation is therefore zero in period 2.44 Thus, the hazard of liquidation is
hump shaped when R lies in region 1: the hazard is zero at the start of period
43 More formally, the judge’s problem is . The business will be kept intactmax {E (VFg) 2c, R}
so long as R is less than the threshold , defined by . If c is small, it willR* R* p H [2/ Pr (HFg)] cg4 g4
never be optimal to liquidate if the period 1 signal is good.
44 At the end of period 3, the business will be liquidated if it is revealed to be type L, the probability
of which is . Thus, if , the hazard of shutdown will rise again in the final period,Pr (LFg) R* ! R ! R*b4 gb
when full information is available.
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1, rises to at the end of the period, and then falls again to zero at the endPr (b)
of period 2.
Turn now to region 2: . Once again, a business will be liquidatedR* ! R ! R*gb g3
at the end of period 1 if the judge received a bad signal, which occurs with
probability . Liquidation will occur at the end ofPr (b)p p p p (1 p)bFH bFL
period 2 only if a second bad signal was received. Thus, the period 2 probability
of liquidation is , which is smallerPr (bFg)p p Pr (HFg) p [1Pr (HFg)]bFH bFL
than because and . Again we have a hump-shapedPr (b) Pr (HFg) 1 p p ! pbFH bFL
hazard: it is zero at the start of period 1, rises to at the end of that period,Pr (b)
and then falls to at the end of period 2.45Pr (bFg)
These conclusions rest, of course, on the assumption that a business’s liqui-
dation value R is neither too large nor too small relative to its expected going-
concern value. If its liquidation value is high (relative to its going-concern value),
the judge will order liquidation immediately after it enters bankruptcy (that is,
at the beginning of period 1). The probability of liquidation, and the hazard
rate, would decline monotonically over time. Alternatively, if the business’s li-
quidation value is very low, the probability of liquidation might be low (or zero)
throughout the case. It would only rise in period 3, after the firm has exited
bankruptcy and the parties have full information about business value.
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